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Umadevi Bars Regularization Without Sanctioned Posts — (2026) INSC 523
The appellants were never appointed against sanctioned posts and were not selected through any recognized recruitment process. Under Umadevi, regularization is impermissible.
Key Precedents
- Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (2006) 4 SCC 1 — Constitution Bench held that regularization of employees appointed de hors sanctioned posts is impermissible; exception applies only to irregular appointments in sanctioned posts for ten years or more without court protection.
- State of Karnataka v. M.L. Kesari (2010) 9 SCC 247 — Clarified that one-time measure under Umadevi applies only to employees working in vacant posts and possessing requisite qualification.
Identically Placed Workers Regularized, Exclusion Arbitrary — (2026) INSC 523
The appellants are identically situated to nearly 30,000 Muster Roll and Work Charged workers who were regularized pursuant to the Cabinet decision dated 22 July 2005.
Key Precedents
- Azam Jahi Mill Workers Association v. National Textile Corporation Ltd. (2022) 17 SCC 797 — Held that equals must be treated equally; if persons similarly placed are treated differently without rational basis, it violates Article 14.
- Pawan Kumar v. Union of India 2026 INSC 156 — Held that when certain employees have been regularized but others similarly placed were left out, such differential treatment is discriminatory, and the same relief must be granted.
- Jaggo v. Union of India 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3826 — Held that Umadevi does not intend to penalize long-serving employees; the State cannot take mechanical shelter under Umadevi to deny equitable treatment.
Visitor Has No Role in Disciplinary Matters Under the Act — (2026) INSC 520
Under the Rajiv Gandhi National Aviation University Act, 2013 and the Statutes, the Visitor's powers are limited to those enumerated in Section 9.
Subscribe to accessVisitor Is Appointing Authority Under Section 46(b) of the Act — (2026) INSC 520
Under Section 46(b) of the Rajiv Gandhi National Aviation University Act, 2013, the Visitor (President of India) appointed the First Registrar.
Subscribe to accessWill Validly Proved, Exclusion Not Suspicious — (2026) INSC 521
The Will was duly executed and proved through the testimony of an attesting witness.
Key Precedents
- Rabindra Nath Mukherjee v. Panchanan Banerjee (1995) 4 SCC 459 — Held that mere deprivation of natural heirs is not by itself a suspicious circumstance because the whole idea of a Will is to interfere with normal succession.
- Shivakumar v. Sharanabasappa (2021) 11 SCC 277 — Held that suspicious circumstances must be real, germane and valid; the exclusion of natural heirs without more does not qualify.
- G. Amalorpavam v. R. C. Diocese of Madurai (2006) 3 SCC 224 — Held that non-compliance with Order XLI Rule 31 CPC does not vitiate judgment if there is substantial compliance.
Will Invalid Due to Suspicious Exclusion of Natural Heirs — (2026) INSC 521
The testator excluded his wife and five children from the Will without any valid reason. This exclusion of natural heirs constitutes a suspicious circumstance that vitiates the Will.
Key Precedents
- Ram Piari v. Bhagwant (1990) 3 SCC 364 — Held that prudence requires a reason for denying inheritance to natural heirs; absence of reason shrouds the disposition with suspicion.
- Shivakumar v. Sharanabasappa (2021) 11 SCC 277 — Held that suspicious circumstances must be real, germane and valid; the exclusion of natural heirs without reason is a real suspicious circumstance.
- Meena Pradhan v. Kamla Pradhan 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1198 — Held that stringent requisites for proof of Will are statutorily enjoined to rule out manipulation.
Ad Interim Maintenance Valid Without Separate Application — NaXXXX Kumar
Ad-interim maintenance is a discretionary relief granted to prevent destitution. No separate application is mandatory — the Court can act on its own motion.
Key Precedents
- Kusum Sharma v. Mahinder Kumar Sharma (2020 SCC OnLine Del 931) — Delhi High Court held that if admitted income of the respondent is on record, the Court may fix ad-interim maintenance even before affidavits are filed; this direction has not been overruled by the Supreme Court.
- Inder Singh v. Sumitra (2019 SCC OnLine Del 9485) — Delhi High Court held that filing of a separate application for interim maintenance is not a pre-condition under Section 125 CrPC; the Court can grant maintenance without an application.
- Rajesh Chaudhary v. Nirmala Chaudhary (2006) 86 DRJ 61 — Delhi High Court held that ad-interim maintenance may be granted based on the respondent's admitted income to avoid hardship.
No Provision for Ad Interim Maintenance Under Section 125 — NaXXXX Kumar
Section 125 CrPC has no provision for grant of ad-interim maintenance. The Family Court erred by equating ad-interim maintenance with interim maintenance without a specific application.
Key Precedents
- Rajnesh v. Neha (2021) 2 SCC 324 — Supreme Court held that a concise application for interim maintenance along with Affidavit of Disclosure of Assets and Liabilities is mandatory; the Family Court cannot grant maintenance without such application.
- Manish Divedi v. Jyotsana (2019 SCC OnLine Del 10492) — Delhi High Court distinguished ad-interim maintenance from interim maintenance, but held that ad-interim maintenance must be based on prima facie material; the Family Court here passed a detailed order after hearing, which is more than ad-interim.
- Rajesh Chaudhary v. Nirmala Chaudhary (2006) 86 DRJ 61 — Held that ad-interim maintenance may be granted based on admitted income, but only where the respondent admits liability; the petitioner here never admitted liability.
Statutory Right to Additional TDR Cannot Be Waived or Barred by Delay — (2026) INSC 517
The right to additional amenity TDR under Section 126(1)(b) of the MRTP Act is a statutory right that is a manifestation of Article 300A.
Key Precedents
- Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (2009) 5 SCC 24 — Held that no conditions beyond those in the statute can be imposed; the landowner cannot be made to waive statutory rights; the mutual rights and obligations are enumerated in the statute.
- Kukreja Construction Company v. State of Maharashtra (2024) 14 SCC 594 — Held that compensation is payable without a representation; delay and laches do not bar claims for statutory compensation; a duty is cast on the State under Article 300A.
- Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai (2023) 15 SCC 110 — Held that when the law is unclear, the right to claim additional TDR is in suspended animation; waiting does not amount to abandonment.
Landowner Waived Right by Contract, Claim Barred by Delay — (2026) INSC 517
The landowner voluntarily agreed in the LOI, Undertaking, and Maintenance Agreement not to claim additional amenity TDR in exchange for the right to maintain the garden for 20 years.
Key Precedents
- Lachoo Mal v. Radhey Shyam (1971) 1 SCC 619 — Held that a mandatory provision made for the protection or benefit of a private individual can be waived by that person.
- Sita Ram Gupta v. Punjab National Bank (2008) 5 SCC 711 — Reaffirmed the principle of waiver of private rights.
- Bank of India v. O.P. Swarnakar (2003) 2 SCC 721 — Held that a party can waive a right that is for its benefit.
Appellant Is Absconding Accused 'Sri', Conviction Proper — (2026) INSC 516
The trial court and High Court have concurrently found that the appellant — who was known as 'Ranjan' — is the same as the absconding accused 'Sri' (A-5).
Key Precedents
- Abuthagir v. State (2009) 17 SCC 208 — Held that mere belated disclosure of a particular fact by a witness is not, by itself, a ground to discard such testimony, provided the evidence is otherwise cogent and credible.
Mistaken Identity: Appellant Not the Accused 'Sri' — (2026) INSC 516
The appellant, a Sri Lankan national residing openly in Trichy under the name 'Ranjan', has been falsely implicated as the absconding accused 'Sri' (A-5).
Key Precedents
- Vishwanatha v. State of Karnataka 2024 INSC 482 — Held that where identity of the accused is not known and TIP has not been conducted, the court must examine whether there was any description of the accused in the FIR or in statements recorded during investigation; absence thereof makes conviction unsafe.
- Abuthagir v. State (2009) 17 SCC 208 — Distinguished: the principle that belated disclosure does not discard testimony applies to delay in examination of witnesses, not to material improvements after earlier depositions were silent.
Misdeclaration Requires Intent and Illegal Gain Under Grid Code — (2026) INSC 515
The Punjab State Grid Code, 2013 requires a finding of intentional misdeclaration (gaming) with motive to make undue profit before penalty can be imposed.
Key Precedents
- TPDDL v. PPCL (Petition No. 199/MP/2019, CERC, 29.11.2023) — Held that misdeclaration of declared capability requires absence of adequate coal stock or plant shutdown/repair; mere failure to achieve declared capacity is not sufficient.
- PSEB v. CERC (Appeal No. 79 of 2007, APTEL, 11.12.2007) — Held that less than 1% deviation is within practical limits and does not justify an allegation of gaming.
- Excel Crop Care Ltd. v. CCI (2017) 8 SCC 47 — Held that where two reasonable interpretations are possible, the interpretation favouring the assessee should be adopted, especially for penal provisions.
Demonstration of Declared Capacity Invites Strict Liability — (2026) INSC 515
Regulation 11.3.13 of the Punjab State Grid Code, 2013 imposes a strict liability penalty for failure to demonstrate declared capacity when asked by the SLDC.
Key Precedents
- Union of India v. Dharamendra Textile Processors (2008) 13 SCC 369 — Held that penalty arising from breach of civil obligation does not require proof of mens rea; the mere use of the word 'penalty' is not determinative of whether proceedings are criminal or quasi-criminal.
- Chairman, SEBI v. Sri Ram Mutual Fund (2006) 5 SCC 361 — Held that mens rea is not a straitjacket formula; the language and scheme of the Act determine whether mens rea is required for penalty.
High Court Acted to Ensure Speedy Trial Under Article 21 — (2026) INSC 511
The High Court has the power to issue directions to ensure the speedy trial of cases under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
Key Precedents
- State of U.P. v. Anurudh 2026 SCC OnLine SC 40 — Cited to recognise the distinction between constitutional power and statutory power, but distinguished on the ground that the directions in the present case do not contradict any statutory scheme and are within the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.
High Court Exceeded Bail Jurisdiction under Section 483 BNSS — (2026) INSC 511
The High Court's power under Section 483 BNSS is limited to deciding whether an accused should be released on bail or remain in custody.
Key Precedents
- State of U.P. v. Anurudh 2026 SCC OnLine SC 40 — Supreme Court held that the High Court's directions in a bail matter mandating scientific age determination under POCSO Act were beyond the scope of Section 439 CrPC; distinguished between constitutional power and statutory power; held that a court's jurisdiction under bail provisions is limited to adjudicating the question of release or detention.
High Court Acquittal Based on Reasonable Doubt — (2026) INSC 507
The High Court correctly reversed the Trial Court's conviction after a thorough re-appreciation of evidence.
Key Precedents
- Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1957 SC 637 — Held that the evidence of an approver must satisfy the twin test of reliability and sufficient corroboration; the High Court correctly found that PW12's evidence did not meet this test.
- Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra (2000) 8 SCC 457 — Stands for the proposition that re-enactment evidence is not admissible if it amounts to testimonial compulsion.
- Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani (1978) 2 SCC 424 — Held that Article 20(3) protects against any form of testimonial compulsion, including re-enactment that reveals personal knowledge.
High Court Erred in Reversing Trial Court Conviction — (2026) INSC 507
The High Court committed a grave error by substituting its own view for the legally possible view of the Trial Court, introducing fictional probabilities not supported by the record, and rejecting…
Key Precedents
- Vaibhav v. State of Maharashtra 2025 INSC 800 — Held that motive is relevant but not conclusive; absence of motive may weigh in favour of the accused but does not automatically lead to acquittal when other evidence is sufficient.
- Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1957 SC 637 — Held that approver evidence must be corroborated, but the corroboration need not be on every detail; material corroboration is sufficient.
- Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra (2000) 8 SCC 457 — Stands for the proposition that re-enactment evidence is admissible (though noted as possibly per incuriam).
States and Municipal Authorities Supporting Directions — (2026) 1 SCC 774
The directions issued by this Court are necessary to protect public safety under Article 21.
Key Precedents
- Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India (1991) 4 SCC 584 — Constitution Bench affirmed the plenary nature of Article 142 powers, holding that prohibitions in ordinary laws cannot ipso facto act as limitations on constitutional powers.
- Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan (2023) 14 SCC 231 — Constitution Bench held that Article 142 powers can be exercised to modulate statutory application consistent with constitutional values, as long as the order is not plainly and expressly barred by statutory provisions based on fundamental principles of public policy.
- Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India (1998) 4 SCC 409 — Constitution Bench held that Article 142 powers are curative and cannot be used to supplant substantive law, but can be exercised to balance equities and iron out creases.
Animal Welfare Organisations Seeking Modification of Directions — (2026) 1 SCC 774
Rule 11(19) of the ABC Rules, 2023 mandates re-release of sterilised and vaccinated stray dogs to the same locality.
Key Precedents
- Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commr., 1962 SCC OnLine SC 10 — Constitution Bench held that power under Article 142(1) cannot be exercised to make an order inconsistent with statutory provisions or substantive law.
- Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan (2023) 14 SCC 231 — Constitution Bench held that exercise of Article 142 power is prohibited when the order is plainly and expressly barred by statutory provisions based on fundamental principles of public policy.
- Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India (1991) 4 SCC 584 — While affirming plenary nature of Article 142, this Court held that due regard must be had to statutory provisions founded on fundamental considerations of public policy.
Vacancies Under Old Rules Must Be Filled Under Old Rules — (2026) INSC 505
The Executive Instructions of 1981 were in force when the vacancies arose and when the respondents became eligible. Under the law laid down in Y.V.
Key Precedents
- Y.V. Rangaiah v. J. Sreenivasa Rao (1983) 3 SCC 284 — Held that vacancies which occurred prior to the amendment of recruitment rules would be governed by the old rules and not by the amended rules.
- Dr. Sharmad v. State of Kerala 2025 SCC OnLine SC 71 — Held that executive instructions issued under Article 162 have statutory force and bind the State government.
- Shankarshan Dash v. Union of India (1991) 3 SCC 47 — Held that the decision not to fill up vacancies must be taken for bona fide reasons supported by appropriate reasons.
New Recruitment Rules Supersede Executive Instructions — (2026) INSC 505
The 2021 Rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India supersede the Executive Instructions of 1981.
Key Precedents
- Raj Kumar v. State of H.P. (2023) 3 SCC 773 — Three-Judge Bench overruled Y.V. Rangaiah, holding that there is no rule of universal application that vacancies must be filled on the basis of law existing on the date they arose; the Government is entitled to take a conscious policy decision not to fill vacancies under old rules.
- Union of India v. Somasundaram Viswanath (1989) 1 SCC 175 — Held that rules framed under Article 309 prevail over executive instructions issued under Article 162.
- Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1967 SC 1910 — Held that for selection posts, promotion is not automatic based on ranking in the gradation list; merit is the primary consideration.
Prima Facie Case Established, Statutory Bail Conditions Not Met — (2026) INSC 503
Section 43-D(5) of the UAP Act and Section 37 of the NDPS Act impose stringent conditions for bail.
Key Precedents
- Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2024) 5 SCC 403 — Held that under Section 43-D(5) of the UAP Act, if the accusation is prima facie true, bail becomes absolutely impermissible; the legislative intent is that 'bail must be rejected as a rule.'
- Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) 2026 SCC OnLine SC 10 — Held that K.A. Najeeb does not create a mechanical rule that mere passage of time automatically entitles an accused to bail; delay must be considered along with other factors.
- NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (2019) 5 SCC 1 — Held that the High Court had conducted a mini trial and reappreciated evidence at the bail stage, exceeding the limited scope of a bail petition.
Prolonged Incarceration Without Trial Violates Article 21 — (2026) INSC 503
The appellant has been in custody for over 5 years and 11 months, with more than 350 prosecution witnesses yet to be examined. The trial will not conclude in the foreseeable future. Under K.A.
Key Precedents
- Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb (2021) 3 SCC 713 — Three-Judge Bench held that statutory restrictions like Section 43-D(5) of the UAP Act melt down where there is no likelihood of trial being completed within a reasonable time and incarceration exceeds a substantial part of the sentence.
- Sheikh Javed Iqbal v. State of U.P. (2024) 8 SCC 293 — Held that once timely trial is not possible and incarceration is significant, courts are ordinarily obligated to grant bail; K.A. Najeeb is binding on smaller Benches.
- Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra (2024) 9 SCC 813 — Held that Article 21 applies irrespective of the nature of the crime; the right to speedy trial is not eclipsed by the nature of the offence.
Preliminary Decree Not Executable, Final Decree Required — (2026) INSC 502
Under settled law, a preliminary decree merely declares rights; it does not create an executable right. A final decree is the sine qua non for execution.
Key Precedents
- Shankar Balwant Lokhande v. Chandrakant Shankar Lokhande (1995) 3 SCC 413 — Held that a preliminary decree declares rights and liabilities leaving the actual result to be worked out in further proceedings; the final decree carries into fulfilment the preliminary decree.
- Bimal Kumar v. Shakuntala Debi (2012) 3 SCC 548 — Held that what is executable is a final decree and not a preliminary decree unless the final decree is a part of the preliminary decree.
- Kattukandi Edathil Krishnan v. Kattukandi Edathil Valsan (2022) 16 SCC 71 — Held that after passing a preliminary decree, the trial court must proceed to draw up a final decree; the suit comes to an end only when a final decree is drawn.
Preliminary Decree Partly Final, Execution Maintainable — (2026) INSC 502
The Decree dated 13.04.2012 is not merely a preliminary decree; it is partly final as it conclusively determines the Appellant's right to possession and mesne profits.
Key Precedents
- Bimal Kumar v. Shakuntala Debi (2012) 3 SCC 548 — Held that a decree may be both preliminary and final, and partly preliminary and partly final under Section 2(2) of the CPC.
- Shankar Balwant Lokhande v. Chandrakant Shankar Lokhande (1995) 3 SCC 413 — Held that a final decree merely carries into fulfilment the preliminary decree.
- Kattukandi Edathil Krishnan v. Kattukandi Edathil Valsan (2022) 16 SCC 71 — Held that there is no need to file a separate application for final decree; the trial court should proceed suo motu.
Prima Facie Case Exists, Trial Must Proceed — (2026) INSC 468
At the stage of framing of charges, the court is only required to see if there is prima facie material.
Key Precedents
- State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa (1996) 4 SCC 659 — Held that at the stage of framing of charges, the court must consider broad probabilities and total effect of evidence; if there is prima facie material, charge must be framed.
- Swaran Singh v. State (2008) 8 SCC 435 — Held that a place can be a private place yet be within public view if it is accessible to public gaze. The balcony and ground floor of a house on a street are accessible to public gaze.
- State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 — Held that quashing of FIR is an extraordinary power to be exercised sparingly, only when the FIR does not disclose any offence on its face.
Residential House Not 'Place Within Public View' — (2026) INSC 468
The essential ingredient of 'any place within public view' under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act is not satisfied when the alleged incident occurred inside a residential house where no…
Key Precedents
- Swaran Singh v. State (2008) 8 SCC 435 — Established the distinction between 'public place' and 'place within public view', and held that a private place can be within public view if accessible to public gaze.
- Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand (2020) 10 SCC 710 — Held that when the incident occurs within the four walls of a building and no member of the public is present, the requirement of 'place within public view' is not satisfied.
- Karuppudayar v. State (2025 SCC OnLine SC 215) — Reiterated that to be a place 'within public view', the place should be open where members of the public can witness or hear the utterance.
Pattern of Contempt, Apology Not Sincere — (2026) INSC 470
The Appellant has a history of scandalising the court — in 2006, 2016, and now 2020. His apologies are a calculated 'slap, say sorry, and forget' strategy to avoid consequences.
Key Precedents
- Prashant Bhushan (Contempt Matter), In re (2021) 1 SCC 745 — Held that a deliberate attack on the institution of judiciary cannot be wished away with apologies; apology must be bona fide and sincere.
- Mahipal Singh Rana v. State of U.P. (2016) 8 SCC 335 — Held that upon conviction for contempt, an advocate is automatically disqualified from practicing for two years under Section 24-A of the Advocates Act, 1961.
- Yatin Narendra Oza v. Khemchand Rajaram Koshti (2016) 15 SCC 236 — The Supreme Court accepted the Appellant's apology in 2016 but cautioned that 'the apology and repentance shall see the appellant in a different incarnation.' The Appellant failed to reform.
Apology Tendered, Mitigating Circumstances of COVID-19 — (2026) INSC 470
The Appellant was under immense emotional distress during the COVID-19 pandemic, receiving hundreds of complaints from junior advocates facing starvation.
Key Precedents
- Yatin Narendra Oza v. Khemchand Rajaram Koshti (2016) 15 SCC 236 — This Court accepted the Appellant's unconditional apology in 2016 contempt proceedings, observing that 'the regret, the apology and repentance shall see the appellant in a different incarnation.'
- Prashant Bhushan (Contempt Matter), In re (2021) 1 SCC 745 — Distinguishable because in that case the contemnor justified his statements and did not tender an unconditional apology at the earliest opportunity.
- Mahipal Singh Rana v. State of U.P. (2016) 8 SCC 335 — The Appellant submits that the automatic disqualification under Section 24-A of the Advocates Act, 1961 is not mandatory; the court has discretion to suspend the conviction.
Primary Liability on Defaulting Trust, Not Students — (2026) INSC 488
The Selvam Trust (SRMCH) failed to maintain regulatory standards, collected higher fees, and caused the students to be displaced.
Key Precedents
- Hind Charitable Trust v. Union of India, order dated 24 September 2014 — This Court directed that fees shall be at Government rates 'till the students so admitted pass out', which the Trust has complied with.
Students Were Not at Fault, Should Not Pay — (2026) INSC 488
The students were admitted through a valid State counselling process to SRMCH. They are innocent victims of the Trust's regulatory violations.
Key Precedents
- Hind Charitable Trust v. Union of India, W.P.(Civil) No. 469 of 2014 (order dated 18 September 2014) — The Supreme Court directed that students admitted pursuant to the order shall pay fees at Government rates 'till the students so admitted pass out', indicating the interim arrangement was intended to cover the entire course duration.
- Hind Charitable Trust v. Union of India, order dated 24 September 2014 — Clarified that fees chargeable shall be at the same rates as applicable to Government medical colleges 'till the students so admitted pass out'.
Concurrent Findings of Guilt Deserve Deference — (2026) INSC 486
The trial court and the High Court have concurrently found the appellant guilty based on the credible testimony of the mother (PW1), corroborated by medical evidence and recovery of the weapon.
Key Precedents
- Masalti v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1964) 8 SCR 133 — Held that the evidence of a partisan witness must be carefully weighed but not mechanically rejected, and that a relative of the deceased is a natural witness.
- Khujji @ Surendra Tiwari v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1991) 3 SCC 627 — Held that the evidence of a hostile witness is not completely effaced and can be accepted to the extent it is found dependable.
- State of U.P. v. Kishanpal (2008) 16 SCC 73 — Held that minor discrepancies in medical evidence do not destroy the prosecution case if the core finding is consistent.
Prosecution Failed to Prove Case Beyond Doubt — (2026) INSC 486
The prosecution's case crumbles on multiple fronts: the sole supporting eyewitness is the interested mother, the other eyewitness turned hostile and contradicted her, the Panchayat witnesses turned…
Key Precedents
- Masalti v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1964) 8 SCR 133 — Held that while the evidence of a partisan or interested witness cannot be mechanically rejected, the court must be very careful in weighing such evidence.
- Bhaskarrao v. State of Maharashtra (2018) 6 SCC 591 — Held that a witness with a strong interest in the result should not be weighed on the same scales as a disinterested witness, as bias may unconsciously affect testimony.
- Ghulam Hassan Beigh v. Mohammad Maqbool Magrey (2022) 12 SCC 657 — Held that a postmortem report is not substantive evidence; the doctor's statement in court alone is substantive, and discrepancies diminish evidentiary value.
Mandatory Disclosure Under Rule 24-A Unqualified — (2025) INSC 1284
Rule 24-A(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Nagar Palika Nirvachan Niyam, 1994 mandates disclosure of any conviction carrying a sentence of one year or more, without any exception.
Key Precedents
- Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms (2002) 5 SCC 294 — Established that the voter's right to know the antecedents of candidates is fundamental to democracy and is embedded in Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India.
- Krishnamoorthy v. Shivakumar (2015) 14 SCC 58 — Held that non-furnishing of information pertaining to criminal antecedents causes undue influence and impedes the free exercise of electoral right, and the question whether the election was materially affected would not arise.
- Pritam Singh v. State (1950 INSC 9) — Established that Article 136 of the Constitution is discretionary and will be exercised only in special or exceptional cases; no such case exists here.
Section 138 Offence Minor, No Moral Turpitude — (2025) INSC 1284
An offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is a technical, strict liability offence arising from commercial transactions.
Key Precedents
- Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms (2002) 5 SCC 294 — Established the voter's right to know antecedents of candidates, but the information must be relevant and material to the voter's decision.
- Krishnamoorthy v. Shivakumar (2015) 14 SCC 58 — Relied upon by the respondents, but distinguishable because that case involved serious IPC offences, not a technical NI Act offence.
- Pritam Singh v. State (1950 INSC 9) — Established the discretionary nature of Article 136 of the Constitution, which should be exercised in favour of the petitioner given the exceptional circumstances.
Settlement Accepted, Marriage Dissolved by Mutual Consent — Manpreet Kaur
The respondent-husband has fully complied with the settlement terms, deposited Rs. 4 crores with the Registry, and consents to the dissolution of marriage.
Key Precedents
- Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur (2017) 8 SCC 746 — Supports the proposition that where parties have voluntarily settled and consent to divorce, the waiting period under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 can be waived.
- Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan (2023) — Supports the exercise of Article 142 powers in matrimonial settlements.
Marriage Irretrievably Broken Down, Settlement Reached — Manpreet Kaur
The parties have been living separately for over a decade, have voluntarily settled all disputes with payment of Rs. 4 crores, and both consent to divorce.
Key Precedents
- Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur (2017) 8 SCC 746 — Supreme Court held that the waiting period under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 is directory, not mandatory, and can be waived by the court where the parties have settled all disputes and there is no possibility of reconciliation.
- Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan (2023) — Supreme Court exercised power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to dissolve marriage by mutual consent without waiting period where parties had settled all claims.
Right to Residence Not Absolute Against Parents — Harpreet Kaur
Section 17 of the DV Act must be balanced against the rights of senior citizen parents.
Key Precedents
- Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja (2021) 1 SCC 414 — Supreme Court held that the concept of shared household requires the woman to have lived there with the consent of the respondent; consent can be withdrawn.
- S. Vanitha v. Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru (2021) 15 SCC 730 — Supreme Court held that while the right to reside is important, courts must balance the rights of all parties, including senior citizens.
Daughter Has Right to Reside in Ancestral Home — Harpreet Kaur
Section 17 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 confers an unqualified right to reside in the shared household, including the parental home, regardless of legal title.
Key Precedents
- Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja (2021) 1 SCC 414 — Supreme Court held that the concept of shared household includes the parental home of the husband or father, and a daughter has the right to reside there even without legal title.
- S. Vanitha v. Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru (2021) 15 SCC 730 — Supreme Court held that the right to reside in shared household under Section 17 of the DV Act is enforceable even against parents-in-law.
- Vimlesh v. State of U.P. (2020) 6 ADJ 781 — Allahabad High Court held that an unmarried daughter cannot be evicted from the shared household by her parents under the Senior Citizens Act when she is in a domestic relationship.
Defensive Allegations in Written Statement Not Cruelty — (1994) 1 SCC 337
The wife's allegations in her written statement that the husband suffers from paranoid disorder and mental hallucinations were made in defence to his serious charge of adultery.
Key Precedents
- Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi (1988) 1 SCC 105 — Held that cruelty depends on the type of life the parties are accustomed to and their social conditions; what is cruelty in one case may not be in another.
- N.G. Dastane v. S. Dastane (1975) 2 SCC 326 — Held that the court must consider the context and the conduct of both parties when determining cruelty.
Allegations of Insanity in Pleadings Constitute Cruelty — (1994) 1 SCC 337
The wife's allegations in her written statement that the husband is a 'mental patient' suffering from 'paranoid disorder' and that his entire family are 'lunatics' with a 'streak of insanity'…
Key Precedents
- N.G. Dastane v. S. Dastane (1975) 2 SCC 326 — Established that under pre-1976 Section 10(1)(b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, cruelty required proof of reasonable apprehension of harm or injury; the deletion of these words in Section 13(1)(i-a) lowered the threshold.
- Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi (1988) 1 SCC 105 — Held that intention is not a necessary element of cruelty, and the categories of cruelty are not closed; each case depends on its own facts including social status and profession.
- Chanderkala Trivedi v. Dr S.P. Trivedi (1993) 4 SCC 232 — Held that when mutual allegations are made and the marriage is dead, continuing litigation is an exercise in futility.
Isolated Acts Do Not Amount to Cruelty — (2006) 4 SCC 558
The husband abandoned the wife and children, lived with another woman, and then sought divorce.
Key Precedents
- Chetan Dass v. Kamla Devi (2001) 4 SCC 250 — Held that matrimonial matters must be decided on their own facts and that irretrievable breakdown should not be applied as a straitjacket formula for grant of divorce.
- N.G. Dastane v. S. Dastane (1975) 2 SCC 326 — Held that the petitioner must prove cruelty, and that the standard of proof is the preponderance of probabilities, but the conduct must be such as to cause reasonable apprehension of harm or injury.
Pattern of False Cases Amounts to Cruelty — (2006) 4 SCC 558
The wife's consistent pattern of filing 17 false criminal and civil proceedings, obtaining non-bailable warrants, opposing bail, and publishing public notices denigrating the husband as her…
Key Precedents
- V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat (1994) 1 SCC 337 — Established that mental cruelty is conduct inflicting such mental pain that the parties cannot reasonably be expected to live together, and it is not necessary to prove injury to health.
- Parveen Mehta v. Inderjit Mehta (2002) 5 SCC 706 — Held that the cumulative effect of facts and circumstances must be considered, not isolated instances, and that a feeling of anguish and disappointment must be appreciated from attending facts.
- A. Jaychandra v. Aneel Kumar (2005) 2 SCC 22 — Held that irretrievable breakdown of marriage is not a ground by itself but can be borne in mind while determining whether the alleged grounds are made out.
Oral Grounds Sufficient in Exigent Circumstances — (2025) INSC 1288
Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India requires that grounds be communicated 'as soon as may be', not in writing.
Key Precedents
- Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P. (1994 INSC 170) — Recognises that arrest must be justified with reasons, but does not require written grounds; the reasons can be recorded in the police diary as required by Section 47(2) of the BNSS 2023.
- Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar (2014 INSC 463) — Requires police to follow procedural safeguards but does not mandate written grounds of arrest for the arrestee; it focuses on the notice to be given before arrest for certain offences.
Written Grounds of Arrest Are Mandatory — (2025) INSC 1288
Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India and Section 47 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 mandate that grounds of arrest be furnished in writing in a language the arrestee…
Key Precedents
- Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P. (1994 INSC 170) — Established that arrest cannot be made in a routine manner and causes irreversible damage to reputation and self-esteem; the power to arrest must be exercised cautiously with recorded reasons.
- Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar (2014 INSC 463) — Held that arrest results in embarrassment, restricts freedom, leaves permanent scars, and that police must follow procedural safeguards before arresting for offences punishable with less than seven years.
- D.K. Basu v. State of W.B. (1997) 1 SCC 416 — Laid down detailed requirements for arrest and detention, including the obligation to inform the arrestee of his rights and to record grounds of arrest in writing.
ICC at Aggrieved Woman's Workplace Has Jurisdiction — (2025) INSC 1415
The word 'where' in Section 11 of the POSH Act means 'if', not 'at the place where'. The ICC at the workplace where the harassment occurred has jurisdiction.
Key Precedents
- Davies Jenkins & Co. Ltd. v. Davies (1968) AC 1097 — House of Lords decision holding that the word 'where' in statutes is often used as a conditional conjunction meaning 'if' or 'whenever', not as a reference to a physical place.
- Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (1997) 6 SCC 241 — The foundational case establishing the Vishaka Guidelines, which the POSH Act was enacted to codify; emphasises that the objective is to provide a safe workplace free from sexual harassment.
Section 11 Requires Respondent's Workplace ICC — (2025) INSC 1415
The phrase 'where the respondent is an employee' in Section 11(1) of the POSH Act mandates that the ICC of the respondent's workplace has exclusive jurisdiction.
Key Precedents
- Davies Jenkins & Co. Ltd. v. Davies (1968) AC 1097 — Although cited by the respondent, this case supports the petitioner because it requires careful attention to the grammatical and contextual meaning of 'where'; here, the context of Section 11 being a procedural provision indicates that 'where' introduces the forum, not a mere condition.
High Court's Acquittal Based on Evidence — (2025) INSC 1435
The High Court correctly evaluated the evidence, found the prosecution's witnesses unreliable, and recorded a reasoned acquittal.
Key Precedents
- Sohrab v. State of M.P. (1972 INSC 134) — Cited by the State but actually supports the respondent because the case holds that courts must evaluate whether the discrepancy affects the substratum; here, the High Court found that the discrepancies went to the root of the prosecution case.
- K. Prema S. Rao v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao (2003) 1 SCC 217 — Held that the presumption under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is rebuttable and if the accused can show that the death was accidental or that there was no demand, the presumption stands discharged.
Presumption Under Section 113-B Unrebutted — (2025) INSC 1435
The prosecution established that the deceased was subjected to cruelty and harassment for dowry demands 'soon before death'.
Key Precedents
- Sohrab v. State of M.P. (1972 INSC 134) — Established that minor discrepancies or contradictions in witness statements do not warrant discarding the entire prosecution evidence unless they affect the substratum of the case.
- Satvir Singh v. State of Punjab (2001) 8 SCC 633 — Held that the phrase 'soon before death' in Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 requires that the cruelty or harassment should have a proximate connection with the death, but does not require a fixed time gap; each case depends on its facts.
Balanced Expert Approach Required, Not Bans — (2025) INSC 1472
Blanket conservation bans would force a backslide to coal-powered generation, causing massive carbon emissions that ultimately harm the GIB's habitat through climate change.
Key Precedents
- M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (Taj Trapezium case) (1997) 2 SCC 353 — Established that industrial development and environmental protection are not mutually exclusive; the Court balanced heritage conservation with economic activity by imposing proportionate pollution control measures rather than shutting down all industry.
- Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v. Union of India (1996) 5 SCC 647 — While establishing the precautionary principle, this Court also held that the principle must be applied in a reasoned, proportionate manner, not as a license for absolute prohibition without evidence.
- T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India (2005) 2 SCC 324 — Recognised that sustainable development requires integration of conservation and development, and that courts should rely on expert committees for complex environmental fact-finding.
Conservation Cannot Yield to Climate Mitigation — (2025) INSC 1472
The Great Indian Bustard is critically endangered with population below 200 individuals.
Key Precedents
- Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v. Union of India (1996) 5 SCC 647 — Established the precautionary principle and polluter pays principle as part of Indian environmental jurisprudence, requiring courts to err on the side of conservation where there is scientific uncertainty about environmental harm.
- A.P. Pollution Control Board v. M.V. Nayudu (1999) 2 SCC 718 — Affirmed that the precautionary principle places the burden of proof on the industrial developer to show that their activity will not cause irreversible environmental harm.
- T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India (2005) 2 SCC 324 — Held that conservation of forests and wildlife is not subordinate to development needs, and that the principle of sustainable development requires integration of environmental concerns into all development decisions.
Section 74 of RFCTLARR is Self-Contained, Excludes Section 5
Section 74 of RFCTLARR of the 2013 Act provides a complete and exhaustive limitation scheme with a 60-day period extendable by a further 60 days upon sufficient cause, leaving no room for Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
Key Precedents
- Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narian Mishra (1974) 2 SCC 133 — Supports that even without express words, exclusion of the Limitation Act can be implied from the scheme of the special law where it provides a complete and exhaustive limitation mechanism.
- State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha (1969) 2 SCC 187 — Held that where a special statute provides for its own limitation and the consequences of delay, the general Limitation Act does not apply by necessary implication.
Section 5 of Limitation Act Must Apply Absent Express Exclusion
Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act mandates that Sections 4 to 24 apply to all special laws prescribing different limitation periods unless expressly excluded. Section 74 contains no such express exclusion, and the proviso does not oust Section 5.
Key Precedents
- Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narian Mishra (1974) 2 SCC 133 — Established that exclusion of Section 5 requires express or clearly implied peremptory language such as 'shall be dismissed', which is absent in Section 74 of the 2013 Act.
- Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of India (2023) 10 SCC 531 — Held that a pragmatic and justice-oriented approach must be adopted in condoning delays by State instrumentalities, and High Courts should avoid pedantry.